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FOURTH AMENDMENT-SEARCH OF AN INDIVIDUAL PURSUANT TO A
WARRANT TO SEARCH THE PREMISES
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979).

In Ybarra v. Illinois,' the Supreme Court clarified
the standard which law enforcement officers must
meet before searching persons found upon premises
described in a warrant which does not name them.
Until Ybarra, courts could formulate their own
requirements as to the amount of suspicion a police2
officer must have before searching such persons.
Although in reality the Court based its decision on
the paucity of evidence found to justify the search,
the Court adhered to the principles of Terry v. Ohio,3
announcing that police must have probable cause
to search persons unnamed in a warrant in all cases
except those where weapons are suspected. Although the Supreme Court appears to provide a
clear and definite standard, the question still remains whether this determination can be applied
effectively by lower courts when the fact situation
is not so obviously lacking in suspicion as in Ybarra.
I
On March 1, 1976, a reliable informant told
police that during the previous weekend, while in
the Aurora Tap Tavern in Aurora, Illinois, he had
observed that the bartender had fifteen to twentyfive tinfoil packets on his person. The informant
believed the packets contained heroin. 4 The resulting warrant authorized a search of the premises of
the tavern and the person of the bartender for
contraband and other controlled substances.
The eight officers who arrived at the tavern
performed a "cursory search for weapons" of all
twelve patrons present. One of those patrons, defendant Ventura Ybarra, was standing by a pinball
machine when the police entered. An officer patted
Ybarra down and felt "a cigarette pack with objects
in it" in his pants pocket.5 Instead of immediately
removing the package, the officer searched the
other patrons. Then the officer returned to Ybarra
1444 U.S. 85 (1979).
2 See State v. Mendez, 115 Ariz. 367, 565 P.2d 873

(1977); People v. Dukes, 48 Ill. App. 3d 237, 363 N.E.2d

62 (1977); State v. Loudermilk, 208 Kan. 893, 494 P.2d

1174 (1972).

3 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

4 444 U.S. at 88.
5Id.

and removed the cigarette pack from his pocket.
Inside the pack the officer found six tinfoil packets
containing a powdery substance which later analysis identified as heroin.
A grand jury indicted Ybarra for unlawful possession of heroin. His motion to suppress the evidence was made prior to trial but denied based on
the Illinois detention and search statute, which
read as follows:
In the execution of the warrant the person executing
thd same may reasonably detain to search any person
in the place at the time:
(a) To protect himself from attack, or
(b) To prevent the disposal or concealment of any
instruments, articles
or things particularly described
6
in the warrant.

The motion was denied under the authority of
subsection (b) and the trial court convicted Ybarra
of possession of heroin.
The Illinois appellate court affirmed the conviction holding that the trial court constitutionally
applied the Illinois detention and search statute to
the facts as presented. The court reached its result
by comparing and contrasting the facts in Ybarra
with cases containing similar fact patterns resolved
by the courts in Illinois and other states." Furthermore, the court adopted the interpretation given
to the detention and search statute in People v.
Dukes? The Dukes court held that the statute did
not authorize the search of persons "on the premises
described in the warrant without some showing of
a connection with those premises, that the police
officer reasonably suspected an attack, or that the
person searched would destroy or conceal items
described in the warrant."' 10
The Illinois appellate court held that the packets
of heroin could be concealed easily, thus thwarting
6

ch. 38, § 108-9 (1975).
Ill. App. 3d 57, 64, 373 N.E.2d 1013, 1017 (1978).
Willis v. State, 122 Ga. App. 455, 177 S.E.2d 487
ILL. REV. STAT.

7 58
8

(1970); People v. Pugh, 69 11. 2d 312, 217 N.E.2d 557

(1966); See State v. Loudermilk, 208 Kan. 893, 494 P.2d
1174.

948 Ill. App. 3d 237, 363 N.E.2d 62 (1977).
"Id. at 241, 363 N.E.2d at 64.
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the purpose of the warrant, and that the defendant
was not an innocent stranger with no connection
to the premises." In addition, the informant's disclosure indicated that heroin was being sold in the
tavern. 2 The court was satisfied that no other
evidence was necessary to sustain the search, and
therefore upheld the conviction. Ybarra appealed
to the Illinois Supreme Court but his petition was
denied.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the search of the
tavern patrons violated the fourth amendment. 13
In reversing the conviction, Justice Stewart's 4 majority opinion concluded that "[a]lthough the
search warrant, issued upon probable cause, gave
the officers authority to search the premises and
[the bartender], it gave no authority whatever to
invade the constitutional protections possessed individually by the tavern's customers." 15 The Court
reiterated that the exception to the probable cause
requirement espoused in Terry v. Ohio'6 was narrow:
that a law enforcement officer may conduct a
cursory pat down for weapons if he is in danger
and he reasonably believes or suspects that the
person he has detained possesses weapons. 17 In
Ybarra, however, the searching officer testified at
trial that he never felt any personal danger from
the defendant. "Ybarra, whose hands were empty,
gave no indication of possessing a weapon, made
no gestures or other actions indicative of an intent
to commit an assault, and acted generally in a
manner that was not threatening. '
Given the state's inability to articulate any
facts19 justifying a reasonable belief that Ybarra
1158 Ill. App. 3d at 61, 373 N.E.2d at 1016. However,
the officers admitted that Ybarra in no way looked
familiar to them.
12Id at 62, 373 N.E.2d at 1017.
13The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
U.S. CoNs. amend. IV. It is made applicable to the
states through the fourteenth amendment. See Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
14The majority included Justices Stewart, Brennan,
White, Marshall, Powell, and Stevens.
15 444 U.S. at 91.
16 392 U.S. at 29. See also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S.
143 (1972).
17 444 U.S. at 94.
'8 Id. at 93.
" The only fact the state pointed to at the suppression
hearing was that Ybarra was wearing a three-quarter

was armed and dangerous, the Court held that the
initial frisk of Ybarra constituted an unreasonable
frisk for weapons under the Terry doctrine.2 Since
the preliminary search for weapons violated the
fourth amendment, the Court cursorily struck
down the second search which revealed the packages of heroin. Although recognizing the ease with
which heroin and other dangerous drugs can be
concealed, and the important governmental interest in controlling them, the Court refused to adopt
the Terry "reasonable suspicion" standard for gathering evidence pursuant to a search warrant. Instead, it held for the first time that probable cause
must be found before a person not mentioned in the
warrant may be searched, even if the search is
limited to the items specifically mentioned in the
warrant. Only when the searching officer reasonably believes that his life is in danger may a Terry
pat down for weapons take place.
Although seemingly without precedent, the
Ybarra decision actually developed a line of reasoning which the Court had adopted in'a previous
opinion, United States v. Di Re.21 In Di Re, the Court
had struck down a warrantless search of occupants
of an automobile based upon an informant's tip
that they would be purchasing counterfeit gasoline
coupons at a particular time and place. In attempting to gather support for the specific search, the
government conceded that a warrant authorizing
search of a residence would not empower the police
to search all persons found in it. Rather than
concede this point in Ybarra, the State of Illinois
argued it.22 By adopting a standard of probable
length lumber jacket which seems quite appropriate for
early March weather in Illinois. Id.
2"444 U.S. at 92-93.
21332 U.S. 581 (1948).

Court in Di Re stated:
The Government says it would not contend that,
armed with a search warrant for a residence only,
it could search all persons found in it. But an
occupant of a house could be used to conceal this
contraband on his person quite as readily as can an
occupant of a car. Necessity, an argument advanced
in support of this search, would seem as strong a
reason for searching guests of a house for which a
search warrant had issued as for search of guests in
a car for which none had been issued. By a parity
of reasoning with that on which the Government
disclaims the right to search occupants of a house,
we suppose the Government would not contend that
if it had a valid search warrant for the car only it
could search the occupants as an incident to its
execution. How then could we say that the right to
search a car without a warrant confers greater
latitude to search occupants than a search by warrant would permit?
Id. at 587.
2The
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cause, the Ybarra Court sought to eliminate all
previous confusion concerning when police officers
would be permitted to search persons unexpectedly
found during a lawful search of the premises. In
reliance upon Dunaway v. New York23 and Brinegarv.
United States,24 the Court concluded that the requirement of probable cause embodied the most
effective compromise for balancing the preservation of personal privacy with the protection of law
involved in maintaining
enforcement personnel 25
peace in the community.
ChiefJustice Burger and Justice Rehnquist each
filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Blackmun joined. In weighing the interests of personal
privacy and police protection, Chief Justice Burger
supported the state's view "that when police execute a search warrant for narcotics in a place of
known narcotics activity they may protect them26
selves by conducting a Terry search.", By distinguishing between the Aurora Tap Tavern and a
27
ballroom at the Waldorf, Burger implied that
whether police may search depends on the type of
environment and the type of people found on the
premises. Although objective characteristics such
as size and location of the premises merit consideration, combining them with such nebulous factors as type of the environment and people within
would lead to erratic applications. Use of such
elitist criteria as affluence of the premises and the
persons within is hardly the type of prudent judgment which will escape scrutiny under the equal
protection clause. Chief Justice Burger was also
disturbed by the majority's failure to pass on the
28
He
constitutionality of the Illinois statute.
thought that the Court should have considered
constitutionality because it granted certiorari upon
the appellate court's finding that the statute was
constitutional.9
The Court, however, often ignores facial validity
of state statutes in criminal cases. For example, in
Sibron v.New York, 30 the Court reversed the conviction of a defendant whose search was based on
3
New York's stop and frisk law. ' The Court declined to determine the constitutionality of the
statute on its face.
23442 U.S. 200 (1979).

338 U.S. 160 (1949).
25444 U.S. at 95-96.
26Id. at 97 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).

Id.
RId. at 98.

27

2 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1948). Brief for Appellant at
2, Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
' 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
31 Naw YORK CRIM. PROC. LAW § 180-1 (McKinney
1971).
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The constitutional validity of a warrantless search is
pre-eminently the sort of question which can only
be decided in the concrete factual context of the
individual case. In this respect it is quite different
from the question of the adequacy of proceduralsafeguards written into a statute which purports to
authorize the issuance
of search warrants in certain
2
circumstances.
Since, like the New York law, the Illinois statute
is basically substantive, rather than procedural, the
Court need not strike it down. Instead, it can
provide guidelines for future reinterpretation by
the courts or revision by the legislature to make the
statute constitutional. The majority did provide a
clear warning to the Illinois courts and legislature
to modify the statute, explaining that "[tihis state
law ... falls within the category of statutes purporting to authorize searches without probable
cause, which the Court has not hesitated to hold
authority
for unconstitutional
invalid
as
''
searches."
In a separate dissent, Justice Rehnquist made
tortured use of the literal language of the fourth
amendment and concluded that the second clause
does not require the warrant to specify the persons
5
to be searched. However, in a footnote relating to
this statement, Rehnquist admitted that police
must temporarily seize a person before they can
5
search him. Therefore, since the amendment requires a description of the "persons or things to be
seized," 36 and a person must be temporarily seized
before he is searched, such a person must be named
in the warrant.
Apart from this apparently egregious error,
Rehnquist sought to uphold the conviction by
noting that the warrant requirement had been
fully satisfied in this case. Since a detached and
neutral magistrate had found a search of the prem7
ises necessary, 3 and execution of the warrant in
the dimly lit tavern potentially endangered police
5
and innocent individuals, the individualized suspicion that a particular person was armed and
dangerous became unnecessary. Rehnquist would
32 392 U.S. at 59 (emphasis added).
33 444 U.S. at 96 n. 11.
2 Id. at 102 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist urged that the explicit language of the fourth
amendment requires a description of "the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Therefore, only if the persons or things are seized, not merely
searched, must they be described in the warrant.
Id. n.1.
' U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
37 444 U.S. at 110 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
8Id.
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have upheld the frisk and the ensuing recovery of
narcotics on the basis that the circumstances as a
whole provided enough reasonable suspicion to
justify the search under the Terry standard.

weapons and subsequently ten packets of heroin
were discovered on his person. The court, in articulating a standard similar to the majority in Ybarra,
held that "[p]olice officers who are executing a
search warrant of a particular place may not search
II
persons incidentally'2on the premises without probIn order to determine what effect the Ybarra able cause to do so.
decision will have on future case law, it is useful to
The Mendez court was confronted by a series of
examine the lower courts' treatment of similar cases factors clearly absent in Ybarra. The police detected
in the past. In the following analysis these opinions the smell of marijuana coming from the premises
will be divided into two categories: those decisions which were the subject of the warrant. Also, while
which have struck down the searches of individuals the search was in progress, the defendant, sister of
found on the premises (the minority position) 39 and the missing apartment owner, entered the apartthose which have upheld these searches (the ma- ment without knocking. The court found these
jority position). Although representing a diverse circumstances inadequate to establish the necessary
range of jurisdictions, these states were selected probable cause.
43
because each has a statute which is similar to the
Similarly, in two Illinois cases, People v. Dukes
Illinois statute in language and in the interpreta- and People v. Miller,44 the Illinois appellate courts
tion given to it by the reviewing courts.
reversed convictions for possession of weapons and
gambling paraphernalia, and for possession of conA
trolled substances, respectively. In Dukes, the dePrior to Ybarra, several courts refused to admit fendant entered the premises while police were
evidence recovered from a person unnamed in a lawfully searching for gambling materials. The
warrant pursuant to a lawful search of the prem- police noticed a bulge that appeared to be a holster
ises. Though these cases are uniform in result, they on the defendant's left side underneath his coat.
vary greatly by factual context and reasoning in- They subsequently testified however that at no
volved. A survey of several of them reveals great time did they feel themselves in danger. Nonetheconfusion, and indicates that Ybarra could become less, an officer frisked the defendant, found a
a critical case in the future because it provides at weapon, and made the arrest. A further search of
least some certainty in this inconsistent area of the the defendant revealed illegal horse racing bets.
law.
The court reversed the conviction because the recIn State v. Mendez,40 the defendant's conviction ord articulated no facts showing that the defendant
for possession of narcotics in a situation similar to had any connection with the premises described in
Ybarra was reversed by the Arizona Supreme Court. the warrant.45
The Arizona statute concerning warrantless
In Miller, the defendant also entered the premises
searches of persons pursuant to a warrant for the during a lawful search by police. They questioned
premises, similar to the Illinois law, was held in- her regarding a large bulge in her pants and said
applicable because the facts did not justify a rea- she would be handcuffed until a police matron
sonable assumption that narcotics were concealed could search her. She then turned over packets of
heroin to the police. As in Ybarra, the police testified
on the defendant.4 '
The defendant had entered the premises while that they never felt in danger.46 In striking down
police were conducting a search pursuant to a the search the court construed § 108-9 of the Illinois
warrant. He was immediately patted down for statute:
39 See cases in Part II.B. of this casenote.
40 115 Ariz. 367, 565 P.2d 873 (1977).
C' Az. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3916(E) (1977) provides:
A peace officer executing a search warrant directing
a search of premises or a vehicle may search any
person therein if:
1. It is reasonably necessary to protect himself or
others from the use of any weapon which may be
concealed upon the person, or
2. It reasonably appears that property or items
enumerated in the search warrant may be concealed upon the person.

The statute does not expressly state that the officer
must have probable cause to believe one on the
42

115 Ariz. at 369, 565 P.2d at 875 (emphasis added).

4348 Ill.
App. 3d 237, 363 N.E.2d 62 (1977).

"74 Ill.
App. 3d 177, 392 N.E.2d 271 (1979).
4548 Ill.
App. 3d at 240, 363 N.E.2d at 64. The court
concluded that the defendant was not on the premises
when the officers arrived, nor did it appear that the
defendant lived or was related to anyone who lived on
thepremises.
4 74 Ill. App. 3d at 180-81, 392 N.E.2d at 274.
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premises possesses a weapon or the items described
in the warrant. However, the language 'reasonably
detain to search' suggests that the officer must be
prepared to show some reason to suspect that the
person on the premises might attack him or attempt
to dispose
47 of or conceal items named in the search
warrant.
Based on this construction, the defendant lacked
sufficient connection with the premises to justify
her search and seizure. Indeed, both of these Illinois
cases were premised on the finding that the defendants had no connection with the premises
searched. Thus they seem to require some relationship between the defendant and the premises, such
as ownership or residency, yet other Illinois courts
have ignored this distinction entirely. 48
In Smith v. State,49 a Georgia court held that aside
from the defendant's presence in a public place
which was the object of a narcotics search there
were no facts from which the officer could have
suspected that the defendant was carrying drugs.
Here also, the defendant entered while the search
of the premises was in progress. The police recognized a bulge in his jacket pocket, patted him down
for weapons, and found a plastic bag of heroin.
The search, pursuant to a Georgia statutes with
language comparable to the Illinois law, was found
to be outside the scope of the statute; thus the
evidence seized was deemed inadmissible.
Finally, in State v. Helton,5 1 the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a warrantless search of the
defendant and his conviction for possession of lottery slips was improper. Like Ybarra, all patrons of
a tavern were searched pursuant to a warrant to
examine the premises. An officer testified that the
defendant made "furtive movements with his
hands in relation to his pockets, 52 giving the officer
suspicion of concealment of narcotics. The subsequent search revealed folded number slips. The
court, however, found no probable cause to believe
that the defendant was in possession of seizable
41Id. at 184, 392 N.E.2d at 275.
48See notes 58-60 infra.
49139 Ga.App. 129, 227 S.E.2d 911 (1976).
' GA. CODE ANN. § 27-309 (1966) provides:

In the execution of the warrant the person executing
the same may reasonably detain or search any
person in the place at the time:
(a) To protect himself from attack, or
(b) To prevent the disposal or concealment of any
instruments, articles or things particularly described
in the warrant.
5i 146 N.J. Super. 98, 369 A.2d 10 (1975), afj'd, 72 N.J.
169, 369 A.2d 10 (1977).
52 Id. at 99, 369 A.2d at 11.
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objects because the officers had no other suspicions
apart from the furtive movements.
In these five cases, the courts, like the Ybarra
Court, struck down convictions based on unlawful
searches. All five cases reach the same conclusions,
but the similarities between them abruptly stop at
that point. Although in four of the five cases, the
defendants, rather than being present when the
search commenced, entered while the search was
in progress, the significance of this pattern is virtually unknown. It is just one fact that courts
examine, but its weight and importance has never
been highlighted in any decision.
5 In fact, other
courts have ignored it altogether. 3
The approaches taken by these courts also differ
in emphasis and in the amount of evidence required. The Illinois courts in Dukes and Miller
sought some connection between the defendant
and the premises while the courts in Smith and
Helton demanded more objective evidence than
"mere presence on the premises" or "furtive hand
movements." The courts have been unable to articulate any clearer standard than that the evidence in the cases before them is insufficient. The
result is that prosecutors and defense attorneys
must use their imaginations because emphasis on
a seemingly unimportant factor could determine
the outcome.
B
The great majority of cases preceding Ybarra
upheld the use of evidence against persons present
at a lawful search of the premises. The rationale
behind these decisions is quite muddled, being
based solely on the facts of each particular case.
Yet the policy behind each of these opinions is
relative clear-"when a search is found to be 'unreasonable' the consequence is suppression of probative evidence and in many cases, acquittal or
dismissal of a guilty defendant."' 54 The fear of
freeing the guilty lies at the root of many of these
decisions. An analysis of a number of them demonstrates no clear-cut standard but rather some
nebulous and extremely subjective criteria of nexus
or connection with the premises searched.
Throughout the following discussion of cases it
is apparent that the courts have developed no
definitive approach or technique for reviewing
these searches. The courts analyze the fact patterns,
compare and contrast them to similar cases previmSee note 58 infra.
54LaFave, Search and Seizure: The Course of True Law
...Has Not... Run Smooth, 1966 ILL. L. REV. 255.
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ously faced both by that court and by courts in
other jurisdictions, and use these similarities and
differences to provide support for their outcome.
One gets the impression that the courts preliminarily decide to uphold these searches and then
look for relevant case law to justify their findings.
They take out of context and string together facts
which seem to provide reasonable suspicion, but
when these facts are examined within the totality
of each case, it is obvious that their importance has
been exaggerated.
In United States v. Oates,55 the Second Circuit
affirmed the defendant's conviction for possession
of heroin.56 The court recognized the special dangers inherently involved in searches in the narcotics
area, and espoused the language so often quoted in
sustaining such searches. "Indeed, even apart from
the agent's personal experiences, we have recognized that to 'substantial dealers in narcotics' firearms are as much 'tools of the trade' as are most
commonly 57
recognized articles of narcotics paraphernalia."
In three Illinois appellate court cases, People 6v.
59
Pugh,"s People v. Kielcyzynski, and People v. Boykin, 0
searches similar to that in Ybarra were sustained by
the reviewing courts. In Pugh, the defendant was
convicted of unlawful possession of heroin. He
sought to enter his brother's apartment while it
was being searched pursuant to a valid warrant.
He was immediately searched, and forty-two foil
packages of heroin were removed from his pants
pocket. In upholding the search, the court held
that "the execution of search warrants in narcotics
cases is risky business at best, and unless the police
search all persons present on the premises they
endanger both themselves and the search they are
making." 6 ' The court sustained the conviction by
concentrating on the presence of narcotics and
their inherent danger, without even discussing
whether the defendant had any connection with
the premises.
In Kielcyzynski, the police, while conducting a
lawful search of a service station for gambling
materials, found the defendant on the premises
and proceeded to search him. The court found the
65 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977).
6 See also Guzman v. Estelle, 493 F.2d 532 (5th Cir.
1974), where the Fifth Circuit similarly denied a motion
to suppress on grounds that probable cause to search the
defendant was found independent from the warrant itself.
57 560 F.2d at 62.
5869 Il. App. 2d 312, 217 N.E.2d 557 (1955).
'9 130 Il1.App. 2d 231, 264 N.E.2d 767 (1970).
6o 65 Ill. App. 3d 738, 382 N.E.2d 1369 (1978).
61 69 Il1.App. 2d at 316, 217 N.E.2d at 559.

search of the defendant necessary and reasonable
under § 108-9 of the Illinois statute. 62 Finally, in
Boykin, police, while executing a warrant to search
a house, knocked on the front door, heard scuffling
noises, entered, and saw the defendant running
toward the kitchen. The police captured and
searched him, discovering heroin upon his person.
The court upheld the search based on § 108-9,
interpreting it to mean that:
where probable cause had been found to search a
place, every individual in that place could be subject
to a reasonable detention and a search for the protection of the officers executing the warrant, and,
also, for the preservation of evidence which the
warrant authorizes, which may be seized pursuant
to the warrant.63
Boykin, decided shortly after the appellate court
decision in Ybarra, used Ybarra to show that the
Boykin facts were far more compelling in their
support of a finding of reasonableness than the
circumstances in Ybarra.64 The court admitted the
lack of suspicious circumstances in Ybarra and concluded that if the search in Ybarra could be sustained under § 108-9, then surely the Boykin search
was justified.
In all three of these Illinois cases, the courts
sustained the searches without a close examination
of individual facts. These decisions demonstrate
that policemen must show very little evidence of
suspicion in order for the court to uphold the
searches. The cases were used to bootstrap one
another-if a search in a previous case was sustained despite meager evidence, then a case which
provides evidence of greater suspicion surely merits
approval.
State v. Loudermilk,65 where a conviction for possession of heroin was affirmed under the Kansas
statute, is similar in approach. 66 The court held
that where probable cause exists to believe that
drugs are kept or concealed on certain premises (to
the satisfaction of a neutral magistrate), the search
of a person found on the premises in the execution
of a search warrant is not only reasonable, but
62 130 Ill. 2d at 238, 264 N.E.2d at 771.
63 65 Ill. App. 3d at 743, 382 N.E.2d at 1373.

"'Id., 382 N.E.2d at 1372.
65 208 Kan. 893, 494 P.2d 1174 (1972).
66 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2509 (1974) provides:
In the execution of a search warrant the person
executing the same may reasonably detain and
search any person in the place at the time;
(a) To protect himself from attack, or
(b) To prevent the disposal or concealment of any
things particularly described in the warrant.
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necessary to secure effective enforcement of the
relevant drug laws. 7 Neglecting the facts of the
case, the court determined that the existence of the
warrant for the premises alone justified the search
of the persons found within.
A number of cases pursue a slightly different
technique of analysis. The following courts picked
a series of facts out of each case and added them
together to achieve the requisite suspicion to justify
the search. In Willis v. State,s8 and several years
later in Campbell v. State,69 Georgia courts upheld
convictions for possession of controlled substances,
supporting the searches under the relevant statute.70 The situations in both Willis and Campbell
involved warrants which authorized a search of the
premises, named residents and "any other person
on said premises who reasonably might be involved
in the commission of the aforesaid violations of the
laws of Georgia."71 The Willis court affirmed the
conviction of the defendant, not named in the
warrant, based on the following circumstances: the
apartment had been under surveillance and the
police had knowledge that drugs were used and
sold there, the persons present were seated together
in the same room, and the drugs involved were
pills which easily could be passed from person to
person. 72 Admitting that the evidence was "skimpy
and marginal," 73 the court nonetheless affirmed
the search. The court picked a series of facts out of
the case and added them together to achieve the
requisite suspicion.
In Campbell, the police entered pursuant to a
warrant for the apartment, found the defendant
trying to hide behind a television set, searched him,
and discovered two pistols and a small bottle of
white powder. The court sustained the search based
on the fact that police had observed several persons
entering an apartment which they believed to be
the situs of several cocaine sales, that their entry
was impeded, that the defendant had tried to hide
when officers entered, and that cocaine is frequently stored in small plastic bottles.74 Like the
Willis court, this court simply relied on a number
of facts, the most important of them being the
67208 Kan. at 893, 494 P.2d at 1178.
6 122 Ga. App. 455, 177 S.E.2d 487 (1970).
69 139 Ga. App. 389, 228 S.E.2d 309 (1976).

note 42 supra.
71122 Ga. App. at 456, 177 S.E.2d at 488; 139 Ga.
App. at 389, 228 S.E.2d at 310. Discussion of the validity
of this so-called "general warrant" will not be examined
in this casenote.
72122 Ga. App. at 458, 177 S.E.2d at 489.
73Id. at 459, 177 S.E.2d at 490.
74139 Ga. App. at 391, 228 S.E.2d at 312.
70 See
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defendant's attempt to hide, to uphold the search.
The court displayed no discomfort at its inability
to provide guidelines to the next court for a future
case based on similar facts.
In United States v. Miller,75 and United States v.

Graves,76 the courts upheld the admission of evidence based upon lawful searches of the premises
involved.77 In Miller, the police obtained a warrant
to search for gambling paraphernalia. Upon entry,
the police searched all twenty occupants and found
narcotics on the defendant's person. This court
sustained the search of the defendant because after
giving notice of their purpose, the police were not
admitted voluntarily into the premises, and they
heard the sounds of people running inside. 78 These
facts as presented, in combination with probable
cause to believe that extensive gambling was being
carried on inside, gave the officers sufficient
grounds to search all individuals present. Once
more, the court highlighted certain characteristics
of the case without attempting to establish continuity or certainty in the case law.
The Graves case contains a fact pattern similar to
Ybarra. All six persons on the premises of a oneroom delicatessen were searched for gambling paraphernalia although the warrant authorized only
the search of the delicatessen. Again the search was
upheld, this time based on the information received
by officers from a reliable informant, including a
last minute tip that gambling was presently taking
place. 79 However, in dicta, the court explained that
the District of Columbia statute would not authorize the search of a large number of persons present
in a supermarket or other such store when there
was no reason to link them to the objects of the
search. 8° "Although it could be argued that persons
present in the customer area of a store are presumptively customers, here the informant's report
could be reasonable (sic) taken as meaning that the
7-'298 A.2d 34 (D.C. 1972).
76 315 A.2d 559 (D.C. 1974).
7 D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 23-254(a) (West 1977) provides:
An officer executing a warrant directing a search of
premises or a vehicle may search any person therein:
(1) to the extent reasonably necessary to protect
himself or others from the use of any weapon
which may be concealed upon his person, or
(2) to the extent reasonably necessary to find property enumerated in the warrant which may be

concealed upon the person.
78298 A.2d at 36.
79315 A.2d at 561.

MId. This is similar to the logic Chief Justice Burger
uses in his dissent in Ybarra, see note 27 supra.
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people inside were participants." 8' The court relied
on the last minute tip to provide the necessary
connection between the persons inside and the
illegal gambling activities. The Graves court attempted to provide some boundaries to its decision
by emphasizing the size of the store, but the court
again evidenced its inability to determine what
factors were important beyond the confines of the
particular case.
Numerous state courts have faced and decided
the issues confronted by the Supreme Court in
Ybarra.8 In the past, these courts have undertaken
a complete factual analysis of the situations before
them or else have upheld the searches almost summarily in order to reach a conclusion. These approaches may provide an answer to the particular
case before the court but have no precedential
value whatsoever. These courts have concentrated
on subjective factors in each context to justify the
searches and effectuate obvious compassion for the
plight of law enforcement officials. Although
Ybarra's value as a precedent rests upon the interpretations placed upon it by reviewing courts, it
presents a beginning to the resolution of many of
the ambiguities in this area of the law. By outlawing searches upheld on less than a finding of probable cause, Ybarra requires that courts support their
findings of guilt on more than just "furtive movements," "scuffling," and the like.

The Supreme Court in Ybarra demonstrates that
it is unwilling to adopt many of the common sense
inferences that state courts have utilized to uphold
searches of persons not named in the warrant but
present on the premises. Ybarra was present on
premises where narcotics had been seen, yet that
does not necessarily mean that he was a participant
in any illegal transaction. That Ybarra was present
in a tavern when a warrant was executed does not
make him armed or dangerous absent additional
circumstances. What those additional circumstances are can only be developed through future
case law. Factors gleaned from the case law which
will certainly prove to be relevant are nature of the
surroundings, policeman-patron ratio, nature of
the criminal activity, size of the premises, and
suspicious actions taken by individuals.
In addition, the state statutes in question will
have to be reconstrued or redrafted by legislatures
and courts. Reasonable suspicion or connection
with the premises is no longer sufficient to prevent
an individual from concealing contraband-probable cause is now necessary before a policeman can
execute the search. In this respect, § 108-9 and the
other relevant statutess 4 have been overruled sub
silentio and can only be applied by courts when this
probable cause formula is added to them, either
explicitly or by implication.
CONCLUSION

III
Ybarra's ultimate pronouncement is quite unequivocal-before police can search a person found
on the premises when they have obtained a warrant
for the premises only, they must demonstrate probable cause to search the person. Although this
standard prescribes a clear conceptual line and is
easily implemented when the situation is as devoid
of suspicious quality as Ybarra, the factual line has
yet to be established. Of the aforementioned state
cases, many were sustained on little more factual
basis than Ybarra. When the courts are presented
with such situations today, the use of evidence
acquired during those searches will certainly be
overturned.ss
" 315 A.2d at 561.
8 For additional cases in this area with similar results
see Colding v. State, 259 Ark. 634,536 S.W.2d 106 (1976);
Samuel v. State, 222 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1969); City of Olympia
v. Culp, 240 P. 360 (Wash. 1925); State v. Sloughter, 14
Wash. App. 814, 545 P.2d 32 (1976); State v. Chambers,
55 Wis. 2d 289, 198 N.W. 377 (1972).
83See especially, Willis v. State, 122 Ga. App. 455, 177
S.E.2d 487; State. v. Loudermilk, 208 Kan. 893,494 P.2d
1174 (1972). These courts upheld these searches on little,

In Ybarra, the Supreme Court finally articulated
a decisive standard for a search of persons present
on premises when a warrant has been issued for
search of the premises only. That standard is probable cause and the Court will permit no deviation
unless, as in Terry v. Ohio, the policeman has reasonable suspicion that the person is carrying a
potentially dangerous weapon.
The facts in Ybarra were highly simplistic and
insubstantial-the police searched Ybarra and all
the patrons of the tavern for weapons and contraband without even reasonable suspicion, and thus
certainly without probable cause for possession of
narcotics or weapons. The police grounded the
search of Ybarra and the patrons on the warrant
for the premises and nothing more.
It is true that circumstances which have a dangerous and suspicious appearance to policemen
during a confrontation may appear quite harmless
to a judge or jury upon hindsight. The police
if any, more evidence than existence of the warrants for
the premises themselves.
See notes 51, 50, 66 & 77 supra.
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officer cannot reflect upon and analyze many unknown situations confronting him in his daily duties, and his decision to delay action even for a few
seconds may result in harm to himself or innocent
individuals. However, the Constitution requires a
balancing of interests so that "[w]herever a man
may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain
' S
free from unreasonable searches and seizures."
The standard of probable cause is no magical
concept. Situations like Ybarra, where the search of
all the patrons was merely mechanical and not
based on any articulable suspicion, will surely be
struck down, but confusion remains as to just how
much evidence a policeman must show to meet the
requirements of probable cause. The judicially au85Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 354 (1967).
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thorized warrant for the premises surely provides
some evidence toward such a determination, but
uncertainty reigns as to how much more is necessary to establish the requisite cause. Whether, as
many courts fear,86 this will lead to miscarriages of
justice and concealment of incriminating evidence,
is determinable only through an analysis of future
case law. Yet regardless of this outcome, the message of the Supreme Court in Ybarra remains clear
in its commitment to the fourth amendment and
the rights of individuals generally to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures.
SANDRA J. WALL
86 See, e.g., State v. Ryan, 163 Wash. 496, 502, 1 P.2d
893, 896 (1931).

